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Abstract 
There has been a great deal of discussion regarding both the 
communication of scientific uncertainties associated with regulatory 
decisions as well as the supposed need for more transparent 
uncertainty analyses associated with risk assessments themselves.  
More recently in Europe this discussion has been led by the European 
Food Safety Authority’s Scientific Committee.  In this view point we 
both review the ongoing debates surrounding uncertainty analysis as 
well as discuss some of the problems associated with communicating 
uncertainties.  In the final section of the view point we offer some 
recommendations regarding what EFSA could do now going forward.  
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1. Introduction 
There has been a great deal of recent discussion regarding both the 
communication of scientific uncertainties associated with regulatory 
decisions as well as the supposed need for more transparent 
uncertainty analyses associated with risk assessments themselves (e.g.   
EFSA 2015c; Fischhoff and Davis 2014).  With regard to the 
communication aspect we agree with Fischhoff and Davis who note: 
“Communicating uncertainty requires identifying the facts 
relevant to recipients’ decisions, characterizing the relevant 
uncertainties, assessing their magnitude, drafting possible 
messages, and evaluating their success. Performing these tasks 
demands commitment from scientists and from their 
institutions.” (Fischhoff and Davis 2014, p.13670) 
In other words communicating scientific uncertainty is not a task to be 
underestimated.  Similarly with regard to being more transparent with 
uncertainty analyses we find EFSA’s definition useful: 
“Uncertainty is defined as referring to all types of limitations in 
the knowledge available to assessors at the time an assessment is 
conducted and within the time and resources available for the 
assessment.” (EFSA 2015c, p. 3) 
In this paper we provide an overview of what is needed to develop an 
evidence-based uncertainty analysis in Europe.  A large amount of our 
discussion will focus on the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
as it is the first European regulatory agency that has developed a draft 
in-depth guidance document on the topic (EFSA 2015c; EFSA 2016a.  
 
2. Background 
In the summer of 2015 the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
put forward a draft guidance document on uncertainty analysis for 
public commentary.  The stated aim of the Agency is that once the 
guidance document is approved that: 
“…uncertainty analysis will be unconditional for EFSA panels 
and staff and must be embedded into scientific assessment in all 
areas of EFSA’s work.” (EFSA 2015c, p.1).  
The guidance document provides a rigorous overview of both how to 
understand uncertainty as well as how to integrate it with scientific 
advice as robustly as possible.  The publication of this document as 
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well as the further updated draft guidance following public 
consultation  (EFSA 2016a) should not come as a surprise.  Already 
back in 2005 EFSA suggested that within the risk assessment context 
greater transparency was needed and as part of that the underlying 
scientific uncertainties should be described (EFSA 2005; Van Asselt 
et al 2009).   Similarly, in 2006 EFSA’s Scientific Committee 
considered publishing some form of qualitative evaluation of 
uncertainty (EFSA 2006; Spiegelhalter and Riesch 2011).  In 2011 
Flari and Wilkinson submitted a scientific report to EFSA on the 
harmonization of the terminology used in EFSA’s scientific opinions 
including uncertainty (Flari and Wilkinson 2011).  This was 
reinforced in EFSA’s Scientific Committee meeting in July of 2012 
when one of the concrete outcomes was to continue the Agency’s 
work on uncertainty (EFSA 2016b).  Finally, EFSA held a targeted 
consultation between 10th November 2014 and 10th February on an 
editorial written by EFSA scientists published on EFSA’s Journal 
pages on the making of “Open EFSA” including the development of a 
guidance document on uncertainty analysis (EFSA 2015b; Hardy et al 
2015). 
 
From an academic perspective there is much here that is 
commendable.  There have been a few guides on uncertainty analysis 
in the past (including Cooke 1991; Cox and Baybutt 1981; Cullen 
1999; Cullen and Frey 1999; Morgan and Henrion 1992; Thompson 
and Graham 1996) and from a communication perspective there is 
still some confusion on how to best do it (e.g. Bostrom et al 2015; 
Fischhoff 2015; Fischhoff and Davis 2014; Joslyn and LeClerck 
2013; Keohane et al 2014; Thompson 2002).  It is also a topic that has 
warranted plenty of research over the last couple of years (eg Lidskog 
and Sjodin 2016; Lindaas and Pettersen 2016; Poortvliet and Lokhorst 
2016; Wardman and Mythen 2016). So an in-depth discussion on the 
topic by a European regulatory agency is therefore welcome. 
 
That said, from a policy perspective attaching uncertainty analysis to 
scientific opinions will show how complex some scientific judgments 
are and that there is often an element of uncertainty which does not, 
however, invalidate the conclusions.  This in turn may not only lead 
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to a reduction in confidence of the scientific judgments by those non-
scientists who have been asked to interpret the judgment: namely 
policy makers, regulators and stakeholders (see Johnson and Slovic 
1998 for a discussion).  In addition it may lead to the questioning of 
the risk analysis model used in developing regulations as initially 
conceived by the US NRC in 1983 (US NRC 1983).  As one critic of 
the risk analysis school argued: 
“Numerous scholars have provided detailed evidence showing 
that the only reason why regulatory policy-making institutions 
were able to portray their policy-making processes with 
technocratic or decisionist models (ala US NRC 1983) was 
because they contrived to construct representations of the 
scientific aspects of risk in narrow consensual terms, and by 
selectively understating and concealing the uncertainties and 
concealing key non-scientific assumptions” (Millstone 2007, 
p.497).   
 
This raises several important questions for risk regulators and 
communicators.  What is the most likely policy outcome of such a 
reduction of confidence (if any) in a scientific judgment? In addition, 
are there cultural differences?  Are citizens in some member states 
more tolerant of scientific uncertainties than others?  Does it vary 
between Agencies themselves?  The answers to these questions are 
presently unclear. Arguably in a number of cases some stakeholders 
and critical academics would push for policy makers and regulators to 
move from an evidence based and risk informed approach to policy 
making to one based on hazard and the precautionary principle (e.g. 
see EEA 2001 and 2013; Jasanoff 1987 and 1990; Millstone 2007).  
In so doing EFSA’s initial and updated guidance documents on 
uncertainty may un-intentionally undermine the Authority’s ability to 
provide science based and risk informed advice to the risk managers, 
a task it was set up to do.   
 
The initial draft guidance document on uncertainty analysis was out 
on public consultation between 18th June and 10th September 2015.  
The consultation led to 288 comments from 33 different parties.  
Based on these comments EFSA revised the draft guidance document 
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and it was published in March 2016 (EFSA 2016a).  The revised 
document on uncertainty analysis will now be used during a one year 
trial period by all of EFSA’s Scientific panels (EFSA 2016a and c).  
Following the trial period EFSA aims to finalize the guidance 
document by the end of 2017.  Ultimately EFSA takes the view that 
being more transparent about uncertainties in their scientific opinions 
will:  
“enable citizens to contribute more widely to its (EFSA’s) risk 
assessment work and thereby to increase trust.” (EFSA 2015c, p. 
11).   
 
The aim of this viewpoint is to provide advice for EFSA and other 
European agencies which are contemplating to put forward similar 
uncertainty guidance documents on ensuring that these documents 
remain evidence based and risk informed as possible.  The paper itself 
is based in part on 51 interviews with policy makers and regulators 
active in the Dutch Government, European Commission, Irish 
Government, Swedish Government, UK government and various 
European regulatory agencies.  
 
3. Uncertainty: A review of the ongoing debates in risk 
analysis 
EFSA’s 2015 initial draft guidance document as well as the 2016 
revised draft presents a strong case for paying more attention to 
uncertainties, including listing uncertainties and their sources.  As 
EFSA’s mandate is primarily to conduct risk assessment on behalf of 
the European Union, and DG SANTE in particular, the Agency’s 
views on the relationship between risk and uncertainty may have a 
range of implications: Is uncertainty analysis a way of making sure 
that scientific uncertainties are captured by risk assessments? Or does 
the proposed uncertainty analysis constitute a ‘paradigm shift’?  
 
The ISO 31000 (2009)/ISO Guide 73:2002 defines risk as the ‘effect 
of uncertainty on objectives.’ A view commonly held in both 
academic and regulatory circles is that understanding and managing 
the effects of such uncertainties usually involves an estimate of 
likelihood and impact (Aven 2012a and b; Aven and Renn 2009).  
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Risk has commonly been defined as combination of the likelihood of 
an occurrence if a hazardous event or exposure(s) and the severity of 
injury or ill health that can be caused by the event or exposure (s) 
(Knight 1921; OHSAS 18001: 2007; Renn et al 2011).  The seminal 
‘Red Book’ of the US National Research Council (NRC 1983) 
suggested a step-by-step method to deal with uncertainties that would 
essentially entrust risk assessments to natural scientists.  More recent 
efforts to normalize risk frameworks at the international level (e.g. 
IRGC 2005) are broadly consistent with this approach (Bouder et al 
2007).  
 
The ‘classic’ conception of risk that underpin these perspectives is far 
from consensual, however.  In particular it does not capture the views 
of those who ‘advocate more subjective degrees of beliefs about the 
uncertain future ‘ (Bernstein 1998, p.6).  There are a number of 
different and to certain degree competing strands of risk analysis that 
one needs to consider including risk assessments, uncertainty 
analyses, risk perceptions, the precautionary principle, risk 
management and decision making under uncertainty (Aven 2010).   
Qualitative and quantitative measures of uncertainty are proposed and 
argued for, where the use of probability to measure uncertainty has a 
dominating position (Apostolakis 1990).  In the discussion about 
principles to consider and communicate uncertainty, some even 
advocate seeing beyond probability to represent uncertainty in risk 
assessment contexts (Flage et al. 2014; Ferson and Ginzburg 1996; 
Mosleh and Bier 1996; Walley 1996). 
 
A central question that uncertainty analysis therefore raises is whether 
it should be recast as a way to ‘re-negotiate’ or ‘reframe’ the role of 
science (Callon et al 2009; Levidow 2001; Macnaghten et al 2005) to 
reflect the subjectivity or ‘social construct’ of the scientific process.  
These critics of conventional ‘reductionist’ risk assessment have 
developed three main arguments to seek new approaches: 
 
3.1 
A first argument is about the inadequacy of conventional science to 
capture emerging risks.  In other words, to Wynne, risk assessment 
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was originally used as a way to analyse well-defined problems 
(Wynne 1992). With the move to what he calls ‘extensive problems’ 
such as environmental systems on a global scale (such as climate 
change) the conventional scientific approach to cause-effect 
relationships excludes complexity and ambiguity and therefore 
discards uncertainties before they have been investigated.  In this 
context uncertainty analysis should focus on what has been selected to 
count as scientific evidence (van Asselt 2005).  More recent research 
developments suggest that uncertainty should be understood as that 
which emerges from negotiations about the adequacy and relevance of 
current knowledge (Hermans 2015). 
 
3.2 
The second argument is about the limits of quantification.  
Uncertainties, it is argued, create problems that are fundamentally 
qualitative, which means that quantifications and more knowledge 
will not necessarily reduce uncertainty (Klinke and Renn 2002; van 
Asselt 2000; van der Sluijs 2012; Walker et al 2003).  In this context 
uncertainty analysis should be developed in a fashion to introduce 
more qualitative analysis as a way to complement conventional 
quantitative studies. 
 
3.3 
The third main argument is that conventional science excludes 
relevant dimensions such as moral and ethical deliberations.  
Uncertainty analysis is typically conceptualized as a way to inject 
more deliberation into the decision making process.  Two illustrative 
examples include the study Rational Analysis for a Problematic 
World: Problem Structuring Methods for Complexity, Uncertainty 
and Conflict (Rosenhead 1989) and the large study Uncertainty and 
Quality in Science for Policy (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990).  Both 
studies plead for new modes of balancing scientific uncertainty and 
societal challenges that have historically been addressed by science 
through opening up to more relevant approaches and involving 
practitioners and stakeholders to a greater degree (e.g. see Liberatore 
and Funtowicz 2003). 
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4. Uncertainty analysis and risk communication 
Arguably, the debate about the role of uncertainty has focused 
primarily on the adequacy of “old” (that is US NRC 1983) approaches 
for dealing with uncertainty, especially in the context of new 
emerging ‘uncertain’ risks (Van Asselt and Vos 2006 and 2008).  One 
aspect that is largely overlooked, however, is that of the implications 
of uncertainty analysis for institutional risk communication.  
According to the NRC 1983 report, societal input and risk 
communication would essentially be needed before and after risk 
assessment, as well as at the risk framing and management stages.  On 
the other hand, risk assessment itself would be entrusted to scientists.  
The question is whether the NRC 1983 or subsequent updated models 
which argue for more effective participative decision processes (US 
NRC 1989; 1996; 2009) can prevail today (for a lengthy discussion 
see Poortvliet and Lokhorst 2016). 
 
EFSA takes the view that by conducting uncertainty analysis in a 
transparent fashion that this will enable greater citizen involvement in 
the Authority’s risk assessment work leading to increased public trust 
as well as other non-communication related benefits (EFSA 2015c).  
As EFSA notes in its initial guidance document: 
“From EFSA’s organizational perspective, communicating 
scientific uncertainties is crucial to its core mandate, reaffirming 
its role in the scientific assessment process.  The clear and 
unambiguous communication of scientific uncertainty is an 
enabling mechanism, providing decision-makers with the 
scientific grounds for risk-based decision-making.  It increases 
transparency both of the assessments and of the resulting 
decision-making, ensuring that confidence in the scientific 
process is not undermined.” (EFSA 2015c p. 62) 
EFSA’s view is shared by others.  The US National Research Council 
in an earlier study argues that the US EPA should be more 
informative in its communication of risk including communicating 
uncertainty (US NRC 1994) and in 1995 the Administrator of the US 
EPA argued that  
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“a balanced discussion of reasonable conclusions and related 
uncertainties enhances, rather than detracts, from the overall 
credibility of each assessment.” (Browner 1995).   
 
In 2006 the US NRC concluded that the US National Weather Service 
should not only communicate the expected weather but also the 
uncertainties surrounding weather forecasts themselves (US NRC 
2006) a view that is supported by some academics (e.g. Joslyn and 
LeClerc 2013).  In 2009 the US NRC once again encouraged the EPA 
to be more open regarding scientific uncertainties noting that: 
“EPA should encourage risk assessments to characterize and 
communicate uncertainty and variability in all key 
computational steps of risk assessment…” (US NRC 2009, p. 7) 
The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) also 
understood the importance and associated difficulties of 
communicating uncertainty (Moss and Schneider 2000). 
 
On the whole it appears that policy makers and regulators should be 
communicating more rather than less uncertainty.  It is clear, for 
example, had policy makers been more transparent regarding the real 
scientific uncertainties associated with the link between BSE (mad 
cow disease) and Variant CJD in humans then it is likely that the 
public’s trust in the Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries 
(MAFF) would not have declined the way it did (Eldridge et al 1998; 
Jasanoff 1997).  
 
Some academics take the view that one should communicate 
uncertainty no matter how complex the issue is be it a food or a public 
health scare.  There are a number of reasons why such communication 
is needed.  Firstly, the public is on the whole much more competent 
than what experts make them out to be (see Jasanoff 1993; Wynne 
1989 for a detailed discussion).  In addition, if the authorities are not 
as transparent as they could be and prefer providing simple, more 
easily digestable messages, they could be accused of not telling the 
truth (Phillips Report 2000; Wynne 1996).  As Frewer et al argue: 
“People are more accepting of uncertainty associated with the 
scientific process of risk management than a lack of action or 
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lack of interest on the part of the government…It is suggested 
that people want transparency in risk management and to be able 
to make informed choices about exposure to food risk.  All 
information about uncertainty should be available in the public 
domain, together with the means for consumer decision-
making…” (Frewer et al 2002, p.371; see also Hunt and Frewer 
2001). 
Or as Lord Robert May, a former Chief Scientific Advisor of the UK 
Government, argued: 
“You can see the temptation on occasion to wish to hold the 
facts close so that you can have internal discussion and the 
formation of a consensus so that a simple message can be taken 
out into the market place.  My view is strongly that the 
temptation must be resisted, and that the full messy process 
whereby scientific understanding is arrived at with all its 
problems has to be spilled out into the open.” (Robert May 
2000, quote taken from the Phillips Report 2000, Vol.1, p.265. 
 
In addition, past studies show that publics are able to interpret and 
understand explicit quantitative expressions of uncertainty (Fischhoff 
2012) although this has been questioned by others who point out (at 
least in the United States) that nearly a fourth of the public may be 
innumerate and thus less able to understand quantitative expressions 
of uncertainty, and more susceptible to framing effects and other 
interpretive biases (see Peters and Levin 2008; Peters et al 2007). 
 
In sum, a number of regulators, policy makers and academics have  
shown that communicating uncertainty is a good thing as it can lead 
to public trust in the Agency in question and in greater 
public/stakeholder understanding of the broader decision making 
process.   
 
Above we have discussed some of the reasons why one should 
communicate uncertainty.  There are also problems with 
communicating uncertainty to a greater degree and these are discussed 
in the next section. 
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5. Some problems associated with communicating 
uncertainties 
There are in effect three issues: a) Not all empirical studies show that 
communicating more scientific uncertainty leads to more trusting and 
more informed publics. Some show that there can be unwanted, 
counter-intuitive and even reverse effects.  B) By increasing 
transparency about the underlying scientific uncertainty may make it 
more accessible for misuse and or abuse; and C) Does the Agency 
actually need to communicate greater scientific uncertainty 
considering the issues raised in (A) and (B) and the potential trade-
offs (such as these types of communications will be resource 
intensive). 
 
5.1 Empirical studies   
A number of studies have examined whether communicating 
uncertainties leads to more informed and trusting citizens, or on the 
other hand, to more confused and distrusting ones (Jensen et al 2016).  
Similar to the calls for greater transparency, the call for the 
communication of greater uncertainty may be a new “mega trend” 
that simply will not go away (Pierson 2004).  On the whole citizens,  
just as they do with transparency, will welcome greater uncertainty 
analysis if asked in surveys.  They will not want to be perceived as 
being ignorant (Fisher 1993).  That said, beyond this finding the jury 
is out whether communicating scientific uncertainty is helpful or 
harmful in the eyes of the public. In some cases, for example, when 
people expect the communication of uncertainty, such as with regard 
to weather warnings, they will very much welcome it (Joselyn and 
LeClerc 2013).  On the other hand, on a day-to-day basis people want 
to feel certain (Rabinovich and Morton 2012).  When they do not feel 
certain they develop different forms of coping mechanisms to help 
them to become certain again (see for example Festinger 1957; 
Nowotny 2016;  Poorvliet and Lokhorst 2016). 
 
Reading the peer review literature we take the view that overall the 
public will have a difficult time processing information about 
uncertainty. There are a series of studies that support this belief.  
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Johnson and Slovic, for example, in a number of studies indicated 
that: 
a) A large number of respondents would not welcome uncertainty 
estimates and would prefer being simply told whether a 
substance is safe or unsafe; 
b) Discussing uncertainty estimates led to respondents to question 
the competency of the government agency in question; 
c) A number of respondents felt that government agencies were 
dishonest when discussing uncertainty estimates and others 
became confused regarding the use of array of numbers to 
measure uncertainty (see Johnson and Slovic 1994; 1995, 1996; 
1998) 
Johnson and Slovic conclude one of their papers by noting: 
“Uncertainty is a fact of life, but life goes on: similarly, citizens 
expect government action on pollution in spite of uncertainty, 
and may suspect the topic of uncertainty is being raised merely 
to justify inaction.” (Johnson and Slovic 1998, p. 277) 
 
They also found that 65 per-cent of their sample took the view that 
when scientists disagreed on their findings regarding certain 
environmental health issues these same individuals would assume 
“the worst case is true, just in case” (Johnson and Slovic 1998, p.272).  
This is corroborated by research findings that show providing any 
type of uncertainty information will lead individuals to see the issue 
or hazard to be riskier (Camerer and Weber 1992; Einhorn and 
Hogarth 1985).  This scientific finding makes sense considering that a 
number of psychologists point out that the so called “negativity bias” 
is the main characteristic of how humans process information (Rozin 
and Rayzman 2001; see also Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2001).  
Individuals, in other words, are averse to ambiguity and prefer 
certainty. 
 
Other studies show that displaying uncertainties and probabilities lead 
to greater risk aversion as people tend to dislike making decisions 
based on incomplete scientific information (Frisch and Baron 1988; 
Health and Tversky 1991).  Such findings were also found in a study 
by Powell et al who argued:  
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“perceived risk uncertainty is strongly associated with negative 
emotions such as worry and anger and, to a lesser degree, 
reflects a sense of not knowing (Powell et al 2007, p.339). 
In addition the Presidential Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management took a similar view arguing that providing a range of 
probabilities could lead members of the public who are not used to 
see quantitative methods to misunderstand them (US Presidential 
Commission 1997), something that since then has been confirmed by 
Peters and colleagues (Peters and Levin 2008; Peters et al 2007).    
 
Finally, Miles and Frewer (2003) found that communicating 
uncertainty regarding certain hazards to the public may lead to 
increased perceived risk associated with those hazards.  As the 
authors argue: 
“…under circumstances where people feel that they have little 
personal control over their exposure to genetic modification and 
pesticides, and when those social institutions that are perceived to 
be in control of protecting the public indicate that there is 
uncertainty, the hazards may appear to be ‘out of control’, which 
results in greater perceived seriousness of the associated risks…” 
(Miles and Frewer 2003, p. 280) 
These findings should not be seen as surprising.  With regard to 
developing wider transparency policies within the pharmaceutical 
area, similar results have been observed.  That is that although 
academics and regulators welcome greater transparency measures, 
and even though publics are all for it, putting large quantities 
(sometimes in the hundreds of thousands pages) of raw scientific data 
in the public domain leads to confused and upset publics and patients.  
In some countries, most notably Germany and Spain, more than 50 
per cent of the public interviewed noted that if their medicine was 
found on some kind of website as possibly risky they would stop 
taking it, going against the advice put forward by the regulators 
themselves (Bouder et al 2015; Chakraborty and Lofstedt 2011; 
Lofstedt and Bouder 2014; Lofstedt and Way 2016; Lofstedt et al 
2016; Way et al 2016). 
 
5.2 The misuse of scientific uncertainty 
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Experts who attempt to be honest about their scientific uncertainty 
calculations when advising decision makers should be praised for 
doing so.  Only by being honest can decision makers grasp the true 
uncertainty behind the numbers that have been presented to them 
(Fischhoff 2012; Keohane et al 2014).  The issue, however, is that not 
all interest groups are honest with regard to the communication of 
scientific uncertainty.  In certain cases when scientific uncertainties 
are highlighted it can be comparatively easy for vocal partisan or 
economic interest groups to sow confusion and doubt.  Depending on 
the issue itself partisan interest groups have either sought or delayed 
policy decisions citing scientific uncertainty. A case in point is that of  
challenging tougher regulations to combat climate change, in which 
interest groups have argued that the science behind climate change is 
not conclusive (Aklin and Urpelainen 2014; Dunlap and McCright 
2011; Freudenburg et al 2008; Michaels 2008; Oreskes and Conway 
2010; Pidgeon and Fischhoff 2011), commonly referred to as 
“paralysis though analysis.”   Another case in point is the call by 
certain interest groups or member states governments (such as 
Sweden) for a ban of endocrine disrupters in Europe, citing the 
precautionary principle, with reference to the scientific uncertainty on 
the topic (Lofstedt 2015).  As a number of EFSA’s scientific opinions 
are already heavily debated by partisan minorities such as on the 
safety of GMOs and whether or not to ban neonicotinoid pesticides 
(Alemanno 2013) the chances are great that publishing uncertainty 
analysis along-side the scientific opinion will create interest among 
these groups in using the uncertainty analyses out of their proper 
context intentionally or unintentionally to create further doubt and 
confusion. 
 
5.3 Is there a greater need to communicate more scientific 
uncertainty? 
One of the key drivers why EFSA is promoting further uncertainty 
analysis, as part of the publication of its scientific opinions, is the 
assumption that this will increase public trust (EFSA 2015c and e).  
Doing so fits with EFSA’s agenda to become more transparent (Way 
and Lofstedt 2016).  Already at the time of establishing EFSA the 
European Commission argued: 
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“In order for there to be confidence in the scientific basis for 
food law, risk assessments should be undertaken in an 
independent, objective and transparent manner, on the basis of 
the available scientific information and data.” European 
Commission 2002, p. 2)  
Publishing uncertainty analyses together with the Agency’s scientific 
opinions is from this perspective viewed as a further step in opening 
up EFSA making it more transparent  (e.g. see EFSA 2014) where the 
primary driver is on “publishing as much information as possible” 
(EFSA 2015a).  For example, communicating more information on 
uncertainty is in line with EFSA’s Warehouse Project which EFSA’s 
Executive Director, Bernard Uhl notes: 
“Our scientific data warehouse project, which we will develop 
over the next three to four years, will open as much as possible 
our treasure drove of data to be used and re-used for other 
purposes by other people in Europe.  This will contribute to 
scientific progress.” (EFSA Press release 2015a).   
 
The key question is whether a move for greater transparency will 
actually increase public’s trust toward the Authority itself assuming, 
of course, that EFSA’s opinions remain of high quality and thus 
deserve trust.  One can understand that when EFSA was established in 
2002 greater transparency in the food risk assessment process was 
needed, considering the fact that the Agency was founded in the 
aftermath of the European BSE crisis when there was not much trust 
in the food regulatory system (Byrne 2014; European Commission 
2000 and 2001; Lofstedt 2003).  Opinion polls show that after the 
BSE scare no more than 12 per cent of the citizens trusted their 
national regulators (Pollack and Shaffer 2009).  Things have changed 
dramatically since then.  In 2010 a Eurobarometer study found that 
EU citizens had a high level of trust in national and European food 
safety agencies as sources of information regarding food scares.  
Studies indicate that 64% of the public trusted agencies such as EFSA 
to provide accurate information considerably higher than in 2005 
(Eurobarometer 2010).     
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In addition, historically EFSA has had a rather good record in 
handling food alarms ranging from aspartame to semicarbazides in 
baby food (Gassin and van Geest 2006; Lofstedt 2008 and 2010; 
O’Rourke 2014; Wardman and Lofstedt 2008).  This was also 
confirmed in the Paeps report which noted that EFSA was not only 
handling its communication activities better than past European based 
risk assessment bodies, but it was also delivering high quality 
scientific opinions (Paeps Report 2004).  These success stories had a 
positive impact on the European publics themselves.  Between 2003 
and 2007, for example, there was an increase in the number of 
European citizens who said that the EU was doing a good job with 
regard to ‘ensuring that the EU performs rather well on ensuring that 
agricultural products are healthy and safe’ going from 39 to 45 
percent (European Union 2004 and 2008; for a discussion see 
Klintman and Kronsell 2010).  In sum, EFSA had a very competent 
communication department at the time (Wardman and Lofstedt 2008). 
 
What has changed since EFSA’s early years, however, is the greater 
politicization of food regulation in Europe.  With regard to EFSA this 
has to do with the Agency’s rather pro stance on GMOs and the 
never-ending discussion on the safety or risks associated with 
endocrine disrupters (such as Bispehnol A) (see for example EFSA 
2008, 2010, 2012; Van Asselt and Vos 2008).  What the GMO dispute 
showed was how a broad coalition could be formed-composed of anti-
globalization activists, organic farmers, consumer groups and 
environmentalists-to start a campaign to halt the introduction of GM 
crops to Europe (Vogel 2012).   
 
Further complicating matters is the growing debate surrounding 
conflicts of interest which in part originated from NGO investigations 
revealing that a number of the academics who had served (and 
continue to serve) on EFSA’s scientific panels providing advice on 
GMO related policies also had some form of ties to the food industry 
(Robinson et al 2013).   This led NGOs to question the legitimacy of 
EFSA (e.g. CEO 2012).  As the Corporate European Observatory 
noted: 
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“Too often it’s not independent science that underlies EFSA 
decisions about our food safety, but industry data.  EFSA panels 
base their scientific opinions on risky products like pesticides 
and GMOs largely on industry-sponsored studies.  EFSA has 
often been found to ignore independent research for unscientific 
reasons.  The agency has issued controversial guidelines for the 
assessment of pesticides and GMOs that benefit industry, not the 
public interest.  In some cases EFSA even copies wording from 
industry sources.” (CEO 2012, p.3) 
These types of attacks will not go away with increased transparency 
or by putting uncertainty analyses in the public domain.  On the 
contrary recent theoretical and empirical research shows that it is 
almost inevitably going to get worse (Mason and O’Neill 2007).  To 
date the groups that have consistently been pushing EFSA to promote 
greater transparency (and thereby also uncertainty analysis) are the 
NGOs themselves.  They in turn have continued to use the data that 
they “mine” from the various transparency measures that EFSA have 
put forward against the Authority itself (e.g. CEO 2012; Robinson et 
al 2013).  As Baroness Onora O’Neill has argued in the past: 
“Transparency requirements can benefit expert ‘outsiders’ by 
enabling them to access information about the performance of 
institutions and their office holders.  This is particularly helpful 
to expert critics of government, business and professional 
performance.  Expert critics often have the time and ability to 
grasp and use information in ways the wider public does not.  
Transparency is therefore particularly useful to the media and to 
campaigning organizations which can discover information that 
bears on others’ performance (while they themselves are 
generally exempt from the like transparency requirements).” 
O’Neill 2006, p. 88). 
In addition, being more open to uncertainty analysis may lead to 
academics critical of the dominant risk analysis model to question the 
need for evidence-based and risk-informed policy making itself (e.g. 
Millstone 2007).  Similarly, advocating greater openness can be 
perceived as a threat by members in the broader risk assessment 
community who work with EFSA (Bijker et al 2009).   
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EFSA’s Scientific Committee is aware of these criticisms as they 
were raised by a number of organisations at the time of the 2015 
public consultation.  In response to them the Committee noted: 
“The Scientific Committee acknowledges the tension identified 
by the commenter, between the fundamental need for 
transparency and the closer scrutiny this brings to the decision-
making process.  This is not an argument for limiting 
transparency of the scientific assessment but for improving the 
quality of both assessment and communication, and improving 
the transparency and communication of the decision-making 
process, including justification for the trade-offs made by 
decision-makers between benefits, risks and uncertainties…” 
(EFSA 2016b, p. 22) 
In other words the Scientific Committee takes the view that these 
concerns can be overcome by simply becoming better—which will 
most likely require greater resources, something that Fischhoff and 
Davis have noted previously (Fischhoff and Davis 2014). 
 
6. How can uncertainty analysis lead to hazard based 
regulation? 
Uncertainty relates to a lack of knowledge and the difficulty to predict 
future events, outcomes and consequences (Hermans 2015; Van 
Asselt 2000).  Calls over time for new forms of uncertainty analysis 
stem from the perception that the so called modern ‘risk society’ 
creates different even greater more unpredictable risks (Beck1992).   
In this context, conventional scientific methods for risk assessment 
have been portrayed for over 30 years as flawed (Jasanoff 1990; 
Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Millstone et al 2008) on the basis that risk 
assessments are socially and politically biased, and used as a tool by 
industry to promote certain products (e.g. Michaels 2008).  To make 
matters worse these same critics take the view that risk assessment is 
a technique to examine well-defined problems.  When it comes to 
modern day environmental issues-be it the regulation of endocrine 
disrupters or combatting climate change-then decision makers are 
dealing with either ordinary scientific uncertainty or great scientific 
uncertainty (Arrow et al 1996; Faucheux and Froger 1995; Hansson 
1996).  In these circumstances scientific approaches focusing solely 
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on cause and effect relationships, of which risk assessment is a part, is 
considered as simply not working.   Rather what happens is the 
development of a so called ‘post-normal’ type of system where 
‘typically facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and 
decisions urgent’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991 and 1993; Funtowicz 
2001).  It is in these types of post normal environments when the 
precautionary principle can, and where many of its proponents argue 
that it should, be used (e.g. European Environment Agency 2001 and 
2013; Tallacchini 2014).  In sum, proponents of the precautionary 
principle argue that the use of risk analyses methodologies as defined 
by the US National Research Council (that is risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication) and implemented by bodies 
such as OECD and member states throughout Europe, most notably 
the Netherlands and the UK, are simply outdated and are no longer of 
any use in the modern day environment (Millstone 2007). 
 
By EFSA arguing for adding uncertainty analysis to scientific 
opinions this opens the door to scientists and campaigners who see the 
recognition and discussion of uncertainties as further evidence that the 
Agency is working on ‘post normal’ science issues and that therefore 
the precautionary principle needs to be more often invoked.  
 
EFSA’ Scientific Committee was aware of these concerns and when 
they were raised by a number of commentaries the Committee noted: 
“The Precautionary Principle is a matter for decision makers, 
not assessors, so detailed discussion of its meaning, relevance 
and application are outside the scope of EFSA’s Guidance.  
Decisions on the application of the precautionary principle 
require consideration of the degree of uncertainty, information 
on which will be improved by the approaches in the draft 
Guidance.  The Guidance therefore contributes to improving the 
consideration and transparency in the decision-making process 
and reduce, rather than increase, the issues which commentaries 
are concerned about.” (EFSA 2016b, p. 21) 
In other words EFSA takes the view that their Guidance document, 
when finalized, will reduce the unscientific application of the 
precautionary principle (see Lofstedt 2014b for a discussion). 
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7. What do we need to do now going forward? 
EFSA and other European agencies are committed to developing 
some form of uncertainty analysis (eg ECDC 2016).  This topic will 
simply not go away, especially not as there is so much support for it 
from highly esteemed institutions such as the US National Academy 
of Sciences and other bodies (ECDC 2016; US NRC 2009).  That 
said, the question that has to be asked is what is now needed to 
promote evidence-based uncertainty analysis in Europe?  There are a 
number of recommendations that should be considered.  
 
7.1  Conduct research evaluating EFSA’s uncertainty analysis 
communications. 
All forms of communications put forward by regulatory agencies need 
to be pretested and evaluated so as to find out if messages and 
communication programs actually have their intended effect 
(Fischhoff et al 2011). More often than not risk messages put forward 
by European regulatory agencies are neither pretested nor properly 
evaluated.  Past studies show, for example, that the European 
Medicines Agency were unaware what effects their calls for greater 
transparency in the pharmaceutical area would have on the public and 
or patients (Bouder et al 2015; Lofstedt and Bouder 2014).    This 
principle also applies to attaching uncertainty analysis to scientific 
opinions.  There is a need to get a clear idea as soon as possible of 
how the public and other stakeholders will view this new approach.  
Will the public broadly welcome them, or will it be more distrustful 
of science and the Agencies that promote them?  At present time this 
is unclear.  As Fischhoff et al (2011) discuss this research could be 
anything from low to medium to high cost depending on how accurate 
an understanding EFSA wants on the impacts of its uncertainty 
analysis communications.  Considering this review, it seems that a lot 
is at stake for EFSA.  We therefore welcome EFSA’s recent decision 
to fund an independent research project: 
“to test messages and establish best practice for communicating 
scientific uncertainties to recipients of EFSA’s scientific advice 
(e.g. decision-makers, media, public)  (EFSA 2016c).  
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7.2 Promoting evidence based uncertainty 
In order to prevent an ‘over-precautionary bias’, uncertainty should be 
seen as an integral part of risk and should be assessed and managed 
through a ‘risk handling chain’ modelled on the NRC’s seminal 
document Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (US NRC 1983) .  In so doing, uncertainty analysis should be 
part of the risk assessment process and seen as a tool for policy 
makers and regulators (risk managers) to better understand how much 
certainty (or uncertainty) there is in the underlying scientific opinions 
making up the risk assessment itself (EFSA 2016b; US NRC 2009).  
In such a scenario, uncertainty analysis should not be viewed as 
another tool in the larger transparency tool box but as an integral part 
of risk assessment.   
 
7.3 Scientists need to become better communicators of 
uncertainty.   
At present scientists are overall poor communicators when it comes to 
scientific uncertainty (Budescu et al 2009; Fischhoff and Davis 2014). 
Hence, uncertainty analysis should not be pursued as a goal on its 
own, but rather, in the context of more general training of scientists in 
the area of risk communication.    
 
7.4 EFSA needs to avoid falling in the trap of “path-dependency” 
 To date EFSA has spent more than 10 years trying to develop better 
uncertainty guidance to their scientific opinions.  For this the Agency 
should be commended for.  The Agency needs now, however, to be 
careful that it does not fall into the trap of “path dependency” (Pierson 
2004).  That is to say as the Agency now has spent some more time 
and resource in developing guidance on uncertainty, and with certain 
academics and advisors with the Scientific Committee having spent 
more or less their entire careers working in this area, the Committee 
may have a difficult time to reverse course should the testing of 
uncertainty analysis messages on the public lead to unfavorable 
results.   This is all the more worrying considering that the Scientific 
Committee is at times using rather loaded language in defending its 
position noting for example in its revised uncertainty guidance that: 
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“…communicating scientific uncertainties is crucial to its core 
mandate, reaffirming its role in the risk analysis process.  There 
is a moral obligation to be open and transparent to the public.” 
(EFSA 2016a, p.102) 
 
7.5 There is a need to broaden the discussion on uncertainty 
analysis 
To date EFSA has done an admiral job reaching out to other 
regulatory bodies and agencies on the work they are doing on 
uncertainty analysis such as arranging a workshop on the topic in the 
summer 2015 (EFSA 2015d).  In addition it is encouraging that 
ECDC is leading a similar effort on behalf of all the European 
Agencies through the EU Agency Network for Scientific Advice 
(ECDC 2016).  This is, however, not enough.  What is required now 
is to have a deeper academically enriched discussion on how to best 
go forward in the area of uncertainty analysis.  We hope that this 
article has gone some way towards meeting this goal but more is 
required.  What is needed before the EFSA guidance is finalized is an 
international scientific summit that would firstly, focus on best 
practices of uncertainty analysis and secondly, examine what should 
be done on this topic within the European policy arena.  Ideally that 
summit should be held in Brussels in the fall of 2017 and hosted by 
Commissioner Moedas of DG Research.   
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